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1.

Introduction

This is a critical moment in our cultural life. The ownership and control
of information resources is one of the most important forms of power in
contemporary society.1 Digital technologies therefore have the potential
to alter and subvert power structures by changing the ways in which we
access, engage with, and participate in the creation of these resources.
By the same token, intellectual property laws have the capacity to shore
up existing power structures and limit creative practices by enforcing
and expanding traditional proprietary norms in the digital environment.
Networked technologies present unprecedented opportunities for creative
expression and participation in public discourse; but these technologies,
and the activities they facilitate, are subject to legal regimes that allocate
exclusive rights over information resources, restricting their creation,
dissemination and development.
Copyright law, which creates exclusive rights over intellectual expression, is one such regime. Copyright attaches to original literary, dramatic,
musical and artistic expression, granting authors and subsequent owners
the power to control the production, reproduction, publication and performance of their works. Fundamentally, copyright is no more than ‘the
right to multiply copies of a published work, or the right to make the work
public and still retain the beneficial interest therein.’2 But through the
powers of control that it grants to authors and subsequent owners, copyright regulates the production and exchange of meaning and information,
and shapes social relations of communication. Writers, artists, musicians,
performers, software programmers, publishers, students, researchers,
librarians, teachers, readers, movie-goers, music fans – and so, one might
say, all of us – exist in a web of cultural relations subject to the law of
copyright.
The emergence of the digital world has rapidly generated a new public
idea of communication, discourse, participation and production – one
that values networking over singularity, and relationships over individuation. Most importantly, however, this new public idea favours a collaborative model of shared and cumulative cultural dialogue over a proprietary
model of cultural production. Within this model, epitomised by social
media, fan sites, digital sampling and file sharing, conventional ideas of
1

CRAIG PRINT.indd 1

29/06/2011 10:01

2

Copyright, communication and culture

individual ownership are swept aside. This explains why the recent focus
of intellectual property policy-makers around the globe has been predominantly on the threats rather than the promises of digital technology.
Copyright appears to have arrived at a crossroads: it increasingly seems
that a choice is being made between maximising the potential of the digital
revolution and reinforcing the traditional norms of the analog world.
Thankfully, this is a false dilemma: as I will argue, copyright contains
within it the norms and aspirations that not only permit but necessitate the
development of a robust cultural landscape3 in which citizens freely participate – a social space made more open, accessible, democratic and vital
by the advances of network technologies.
From a utilitarian or instrumental perspective, the exclusive rights that
copyright grants are justified as a means by which to maximise cultural
production and exchange by encouraging the production of intellectual
works. The underlying rationale is that such works will be under-produced
unless authors are given sufficient opportunity to exploit them for financial return.4 Rationalised in these terms, the exclusive rights of authors
might be said to ‘encourage learning’5 and to ‘promote the progress of the
useful arts’.6 From this it should follow that the rights granted to authors
under the copyright system affirm the value that we as a society place in
the cultural exchange and interaction represented by the production and
dissemination of intellectual works.
Many utilitarian versions of copyright theory presuppose but fail to
explain this initial premise. A pure economic theory can justify copyright
in terms of the economic incentive it offers for authors qua rational economic actors, but economics alone cannot explain the nature of the societal benefits that flow from this incentive. This requires us to understand
the public interest that resides in the creation and exchange of intellectual
expression. From a public interest perspective, the encouragement of cultural production should be understood as the creation of opportunities
for improved communication between members of society. The copyright
system should be regarded as one element of a larger cultural and social
policy aimed at encouraging the process of cultural exchange that new
technologies facilitate. The economic and other incentives that copyright
offers to creators of original expression are meant to encourage a participatory and interactive society, and to further the social goods that flow
through public dialogue. Copyright’s purpose is to create opportunities
for people to speak, to develop relationships of communication between
author and audience, and to fashion conditions that might cultivate a
higher quality of expression.
However, the role that copyright plays as a cultural and social policy
tool is rarely appreciated. Rather, copyright is widely regarded as a

CRAIG PRINT.indd 2

29/06/2011 10:01

Introduction

3

system whose purpose is the protection of private, proprietary rights.
Notwithstanding the intangible and communicative nature of intellectual expression, its categorisation as a species of so-called ‘intellectual
property’, compounded by a particular understanding of the nature of
authorship, causes copyright to be commonly conceptualised as just
another form of private property. Viewed through the proprietary lens,
the intellectual expression of the author is an object that is owned like
any other. In the context of a market economy, it is simply a commodity to be freely transferred and exploited in the marketplace. However,
the language of ‘ownership’, ‘property’ and ‘commodity’ obfuscates the
nature of copyright’s subject matter, and cloaks the social and cultural
implications of copyright protection. As history reveals, it also appears to
result in the continuous strengthening and expansion of the private rights
that copyright affords. As such, the way that we traditionally think about
copyright – particularly in the modern digital age where works are created,
shared, accessed and transformed more easily and efficiently than ever
before – is inapposite to the task that we expect it to perform. Copyright is
in desperate need of re-imagination.
My aim, in this book, is to provide a route towards the re-imagination
of copyright law. This process of re-imagining copyright is not cast as a
radical or revolutionary one: rather, it works from within the copyright
system, using the concepts and components that constitute the current
system, only reconceptualising them within a revised theoretical framework. Through this process, we are challenged to discard the loaded conception of the author as a bearer of rights and an owner of property, and
to adopt in its place a vision of the relational author as a participant in a
process of cultural dialogue and exchange. This, in turn, requires that we
resist the notion of original expression as a stable, objectifiable thing, and
instead embrace the idea of the work as a text, utterance or communicative act. Finally, this demands that we reject the characterisation of users
of copyrighted works as actual or potential trespassers or pirates, and
recognise them instead as active and equal participants in the very process
of meaning-making and exchange that underpins copyright norms.
Ultimately, this route should lead us to an understanding of copyright
as a system designed to further the public good by encouraging improved
relations of communication between members of society, and maximising discursive engagement in a collective conversation. Viewed through
this lens, author and text are no longer individualised and isolated from
their social situation: it becomes possible for the contours of copyright
protection to reflect the dialogic and inherently social nature of cultural
expression.
As this suggests, the central concern of this book is the underlying
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philosophy or theory of copyright law. I argue that our current copyright
model is premised upon the political and ontological assumptions of
traditional legal liberalism, and the normative assumptions of possessive
individualism. These political underpinnings guide courts’ interpretation
and application of copyright doctrine with the result that copyright law
fails to adequately reflect the realities of cultural creativity, and frequently
restricts the very communicative or expressive activities that it is meant to
encourage. If copyright is to be a justifiable limitation upon the expressive activities of the public, it must increase opportunities for qualitative
cultural production and exchange, ultimately furthering our communication ideals. The appropriate limits of copyright’s protective sphere will
become clear when we acknowledge that the copyright owner’s rights
exist only through this public interest and not in spite of it. Where copyright obstructs rather than facilitates relations of communication, it goes
beyond the bounds of its justification.
The crux of this re-imagined theoretical framework for copyright is
developed in Part I of the book, which challenges the liberal and neo-liberal theorising implicit in modern copyright discourse. This lays the foundation for the critique that builds throughout the book: namely, that the
existing theoretical framework for copyright is responsible for the (mis)
construction of its core concepts. The concepts of authorship, originality
and ownership are defined and shaped by the philosophical assumptions
that we bring to bear on the processes of cultural creativity and the legal
system that we have built in its name. These concepts, in turn, affect the
operation of copyright law and the extent to which it achieves its policy
goals. The current copyright model, constructed as it is around the transcendent, rights-bearing author-self, is ill suited to the task of encouraging
and maximising cultural creativity and the production and dissemination
of new intellectual works.
I propose a relational model as a more appropriate framework within
which to understand the processes of authorship, its significance for the
author and the public, and consequently, the role and purpose of the
copyright system. Chapter 2 critically examines the romantic conception
of authorship that pervades copyright doctrine, and the power of this conception to obscure the connection between origination and imitation while
individualising the author and commodifying his work. Chapter 3 suggests
an alternative version of copyright’s author-figure, drawing upon feminist
theory to develop a notion of the author as a situated, relational self, and
authorship as a dialogic and formative process.
I proceed in the following chapters to push towards copyright’s re-imagination in these terms. I explore some of the principal concepts and convictions that have caused traditional copyright theory to misrecognise the
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nature of the author, the public and the copyright system, and show how a
shift in thinking may alter the shape of copyright. Part II of this book challenges the pervasive view that the origin of the copyright interest (in both
the moral and legal sense) can be found in the industry or labour of the
author. My overarching proposition is that it is a mistake to look solely
to the relation between the author and her work as the basis on which to
justify the copyright system or to define the scope of the copyright interest. In so doing, we necessarily neglect the social and cultural goals of
copyright, and so wrongly augment the scope of the rights conferred under
copyright while failing to identify and draw the appropriate limits thereto.
Chapter 4 focuses primarily on the role of labour in defining the moral
relation between the author and work by means of which the copyright
interest is justified. In particular, it tackles the common conviction,
grounded in Lockean theory, that the author as intellectual labourer has a
natural right to own the fruits of his labour. Chapter 5 focuses on the role
of labour and other elements of authorship in defining the legal relation
between author and work – what the author must do to establish a legal
right over her work.7 I examine the doctrine of originality, which provides
the defining characteristic of copyrightable expression, and therefore
encapsulates many of the dominant misconceptions of modern copyright
theory. I suggest that, by re-evaluating the originality threshold and its
role in copyright disputes in light of a relational theory of authorship, the
central doctrine of copyright law could be realigned with the public policy
purposes of the copyright system.
The dialogic theory of authorship advanced in this book emphasises the
cumulative nature of cultural creativity. This reveals the flaw inherent in
the individualised account of original expression, but it also underscores
the importance of downstream, meaning-generating uses of protected
materials. To this end, it is essential that copyright leave space for the
interactive, dialogic processes of cultural creativity if it is to enhance
rather than obstruct relations of communication. As such, Part III focuses
on the limits of the protection afforded to copyright owners to allow for
the use, transformation and ‘appropriation’ of protected works as defined
by user exceptions, defences and rights.
Chapter 6 takes critical aim at the restrictive fair dealing defence and
other exceptions available to users, calling for a large and flexible defence
to copyright infringement (even in the face of technical controls) that
adequately reflects the dialogic nature of creative processes and the critical role of users in the copyright system. Chapter 7 explores the relationship between copyright protection and freedom of expression, employing
relational theory to argue that both copyright and freedom of expression
embody the values that we as a society attach to communication and

CRAIG PRINT.indd 5

29/06/2011 10:01

6

Copyright, communication and culture

discursive interaction between the members of our community: copyright’s legitimacy therefore depends upon its capacity to accommodate
and enhance the principles of free expression.
Much of the doctrinal analysis contained in these chapters is conducted in the context of Canadian jurisprudence. Recent developments
in Canada, and in particular the Canadian copyright narrative that has
emerged from the Supreme Court of Canada over the past decade,8 make
the Canadian context a fertile one in which to develop a far-reaching
theory of copyright. Moreover, Canada occupies a unique position in
the common law copyright world: it inherited its copyright system from
the United Kingdom; it developed its copyright doctrine in the context
of a ‘mixed’ common and civil law system, drawing in part on continental influences; and, with the United States as its only neighbour and
largest trading partner, it is consistently reactive to US developments and
political pressures.
In the United States, the analysis of copyright theory often starts and
ends with the US Constitution and the power of congress under Article
1 to ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.’9 In the US Supreme Court decision of Eldred v. Ashcroft,10 however, the practical force of this clause
proved to be far less than many had hoped. Indeed, the US copyright
narrative has largely fragmented over recent years into property-based
discourse and anti-instrumentalist agendas, as evidenced by the enactment
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998.11 Meanwhile, in Britain,
the copyright narrative has been disrupted, and policy-making largely
dominated, by developments at the European Union level. Principled
theorising proves difficult in a context where copyright laws are shaped by
international obligations that derive from principles foreign to the jurisdiction.12 Because Canada has lacked a concrete statement of copyright’s
purpose, and because it is (at least officially) free to shape its copyright law
according to its own prerogatives (within the confines of its obligations
as a member of the World Trade Organization13), the Canadian context
offers greater space within which to contemplate the purposes, principles
and potential of copyright law in the digital age. For these reasons, the
Canadian legal experience affords an interesting and illustrative example
from which larger general – indeed universal – lessons can be learned.
The overarching theme of this book is the need to discard notions of
natural right, individual entitlement and private property in copyright
theory, and to re-imagine copyright in relational terms of communication, community and cultural policy. Throughout the arguments that I
have sketched in this introduction lies the unifying proposition: only by
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regarding copyright from a public interest perspective and recognising
the social value of discursive engagement can we appreciate the system’s
incentivisation of cultural production as a means by which to enhance
relations of communication. Furthermore, it is only by understanding the
nature of the author-self as socially situated and intrinsically relational
that we can appreciate the importance of communication and dialogue in
the formation of human identity and community.
Individualising authorship and propertising intellectual expression
causes us to miss what it is that matters about cultural creativity; and so it
guarantees that we fail to recognise the real rationale behind the copyright
system. The re-imagination of copyright is therefore essential if we are to
fully comprehend the social goals that justify its existence – and if we are
to have any hope of achieving them.

NOTES
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James Boyle, ‘A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?’
(1997) 47 Duke L.J. 87 at 87: ‘Everyone says that we are moving to an information age.
Everyone says that the ownership and control of information is one of the most important forms of power in contemporary society. These ideas are so well-accepted, such
clichés, that I can get away with saying them in a law review article without footnote
support.’ The irony of this footnote is not lost on me.
Underwriters’ Survey Bureau Ltd v. Massie & Renwick Ltd (1936) [1937] Ex. C.R. 15
at 20 (Maclean J.), varied [1937] S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.). Cited in John S. McKeown, Fox
Canadian Law of Copyright and Industrial Designs, 3rd edn (Scarborough, Ontario:
Thomson Canada Ltd, 2000) at 1.
Cf. Julie E. Cohen, ‘Copyright, Commodification, and Culture: Locating the Public
Domain’ in L. Guibault and P.B. Hugenholtz (eds), The Future of the Public Domain
(Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2006) at 121–66.
See e.g. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of
Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 2003).
The first modern copyright statute, the Statute of Anne 1709, pronounced its purpose
to be ‘the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the
Authors or Purchasers if such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned.’ For interesting discussion regarding the historical beginnings of copyright regulation see: L. Ray
Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press,
1968); Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1993).
Art. 1 §8, cl. 8 of the U.S. Constitution. This empowerment clause explicitly enshrines
into the Constitution an instrumentalist account of copyright law.
The distinction between the legal and moral relation between author and work is
explained by Christian G. Stallberg, ‘Towards a New Paradigm in Justifying Copyright:
A Universalistic-Transcendental Approach’ (2008) 18 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media &
Ent. L.J. 333 at 343–4.
See Daniel Gervais, ‘A Canadian Copyright Narrative’ (2008) 21 Intellectual Property
Journal 269.
US Const., note 6 above.
537 US 186 (2003).
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Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). See Gervais, note 8 above at 293–4.
A pertinent example is Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases [1996] O.J. L77/20,
art 3.1 (‘[D]atabases which, by reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents,
constitute the author’s own intellectual creation shall be protected as such by copyright’). Cf. Sections 3 and 3A of the British Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (as
amended by the Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997 SI 1997/3032).
This replaced the traditional ‘labour and skill’ threshold with an ‘intellectual creation’
threshold for copyright in data compilations.
Canada is therefore bound by the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April
1994, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
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